This Chatham House meeting is chaired by Dr. Julie Norman, Associate fellow, MENA programme. Also on the panel are: Zizette Darkazally, Aaron David Miller and Dr Brandon Friedman.
As the Iran war continues it is apparent that Gaza has ceased to be a priority for the international community. Hamas is not withdrawing and air strikes continue.
The main two elements of phase 2 have made no significant progress. After the October ceaefire, killings have continued and humanitarian aid remains scarce. Due to US pressure certain trucks started to make it through but it falls short of the Trump plan. 60-64% of the Gaza strip is under complete Israeli control. They are mobilising equipment with no indication that they are going to leave. Hmas disarmament remains a sticking point for any furthering of the peace process. They wil not negotiate on a secon phase ntil the first phase is completed. 2026 is an election year in Israel. The Netanyahu government is in no rush to end the war. The trajectory is extremely bleak on all fronts.
There has been an assassination of a prominent Hamas figure after the ceasefire. There are effects on the dynamics of Hamas who are in the process of electing a new leader. The Iran war has distracted what is gong on on the ground but the ditraction makes Hamas less relevant as the US and Israel make decisions relating to Gaza.
An obvious point from Israel’s partners is that it is in campaign mode in politics. Every issue wioll be refelcted in the prism of Israeli internal politics The war has pushed iSrael and the UAE together even further than during the Abraham accords. The UAE have played an important tole in the humanitarian support for Gaza. Hamas remains intransigent. Iran has had a defiant posture. Thier basic approach is Gaza is not to give much ground. The war provides breathng room for Palestinian politics. This has evolved. The Egyptian dynamic has been influenced by the war. There has been criticism from the UAE of Egypt. How Cairo and Abu Dhabi see the future of Gaza is important. Where the money is coming from to move the peace plan forward is a sticking point.
Election season addresses the fact that Israeli society is one in trauma. Almost every Israeli family has been touched by serving in the reserves after October 7th. ALl politics in some degree are local. It is a decisive background for the next few months. Those wishing to see forward momentm are unlikely to be realized.
Gaza in 2026 is going to remain divided and sporadically violent. A US war of choice has now become a war of necessity. There were two assumptions about the straits. That the Iranians would not choose to close them and that is they did the US would be able to prise them open. Everything that Netanyahu will confront will be constrained by h is own idisyncratic political position.
The degree of damage has set Gaza back by 77 years. Trump might regard that he has added Gaza to a list of resolved conflicts. The Americans have failed to bridge the fundamental challenge of reconcling the israeli vision for Gaza and that of Hamas. Israel has parallel responibilitite for withdrawal. By US law it prevents tehe United States from taking a position that situations require. The notions that Israel or the US are going to consider Hamas as a political actor are a bridge too far.
The aim is to disarm Hamas. Who is going to be overseeing this process? This is an essential aim for the peace process. The ceasefire shoud be being reinforced but not necessarily disarmamanets. It suggests a return to histilities. There are no clear answers. Things may not be moving forward as everyone wants them to.
It is imorrtant to know thta in Arab countries Gaza is linked to the Palestinian issue as a whole: The West Bank etc. Intra-Arab relations have been affected and also relations with the US. STability and security in the region are more important than ever due to the Iran war. The Iran war brought Israel and the other Arab countries closer. There is no rsh to nromalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel as it sees Israel as disrespecting other Arab nations. It is time to build coalitions.
The Abraham accords will not be expanding any time soon. Saudi are putting up Kuwait to finance the rebuilding of Gaza.
Isareli-Saudi normailization is one of Trump’s key objectives. The three non Arab states – Turkey, Israel and Iran have the most potential and are different – they are the only states to be able to project their power abroad. Al Arab STates wil be worried by their Shia communities. The US remains focused on the Gulf: Stable, rich and authoritarian.
It raises the question of where money for the reconstruction of Gaza will come from. How much can Israel bear for ongoing operations in Gaza, in Syria, in Iran? The biggest opportunity Israel has with the Iran war is that it has a real chance to impact on Gulf States. It will turn the Iran war into a diplomatic asset. Israel just wants to secure its borders and feelWhen will the US stop supporting Israel militarily? A different American president or Israeli prime minister might reset the relationship. safe within them.
The seminar was insightful and opened up a few avenues of how to think about Gaza. It is clear that hte population there are suffering and it is imortant to imrpove their situation. How the Iran conflict distracts from the Gaza situation is not completely clear but the war does seem to provide a new scope on the Gaza conflict.
Leave a comment