24 September 2026
A two-state solution remains a compelling answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: Israel and Palestine living alongside each other, with both peoples able to govern themselves and live in security.
Yet being a desirable outcome does not make it a likely one.
My assessment is that a functioning two-state settlement is very unlikely within the next few years. Over a longer period, it remains possible, but would require substantial changes in political leadership, security arrangements and international pressure. On the present trajectory, the danger is that the world continues to endorse Palestinian statehood while allowing the conditions needed for it to disappear.
There is no credible percentage that captures all of this uncertainty. What we can assess is whether events are moving the region towards two viable states. At the moment, too many are moving it away.
What would two states actually mean?
The basic proposal is an independent Palestinian state encompassing Gaza and the West Bank, alongside Israel. The framework reiterated by the UN Secretary-General this month envisages borders based on the pre-1967 lines, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states. United Nations, 22 September 2026
Negotiations would still have to resolve borders, settlements, security, refugees and arrangements for Jerusalem. Gaza and the West Bank would need a workable connection, and Palestinian sovereignty would need to mean something in daily life.
A state needs more than diplomatic recognition. It needs functioning institutions, an economy, freedom of movement and the ability to make decisions about its own future. Any agreement would also have to give Israelis credible protection against attacks.
That is the standard against which proposals should be judged.
The land for a Palestinian state is being fragmented
Settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank is one of the clearest obstacles.
The E1 development east of Jerusalem illustrates the problem. The House of Commons Library reports that Israel opened tenders for around 1,200 homes there in August 2026. Britain and other governments warn that the development would isolate East Jerusalem and sever connections between the northern and southern West Bank. Israel disputes that assessment and points to proposed road connections. House of Commons Library
The underlying question is whether a future Palestine could function as a coherent country. Connections between towns, access to economic centres and control over development all matter.
Every additional settlement also makes a negotiated withdrawal or territorial compromise more politically difficult. Infrastructure becomes established, residents build lives, and the domestic cost of changing course grows.
This is why delay has consequences. The map being discussed at a future negotiating table may be substantially harder to divide than the one being discussed today.
Fear and mistrust have become formidable political barriers
The human consequences of the Hamas-led atrocities of 7 October 2023 and the devastation inflicted on Gaza will shape politics for years. Any serious peace proposal must reckon with bereavement, displacement and fear.
A Pew Research Center survey published this month gives a sobering indication of public expectations. Only 17% of Israelis and 21% of Palestinians surveyed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem believed that Israel and an independent Palestinian state could coexist peacefully. Gaza was not included in the survey. Pew Research Center
Those figures measure belief in the possibility of coexistence, which is different from asking whether people would prefer it. Someone can want peace and consider it impossible.
Nevertheless, that pessimism creates a serious political problem. Leaders seeking compromise must persuade people that the risks of an agreement are lower than the risks of continued conflict.
For Israelis, credible security guarantees would be essential. For Palestinians, an agreement would need to offer a demonstrable end to occupation and a meaningful improvement in freedom and safety. Neither population can reasonably be expected to build its future on assurances that carry no practical protection.
Leadership and government matter as much as borders
A settlement requires leaders able both to negotiate an agreement and to implement it.
The current Israeli government’s approach to settlements is moving against the territorial conditions needed for Palestinian statehood. In their joint statement of 8 September, a group of foreign ministers, including Britain’s, explicitly warned that Israeli actions in the West Bank were undermining the possibility of two states. Joint foreign ministers’ statement
Palestinian government presents another fundamental challenge. A lasting settlement would require accountable institutions with public legitimacy and the capacity to govern Gaza and the West Bank. Armed organisations could not retain an independent power to launch attacks and overturn an agreement.
Britain’s recognition of Palestine in September 2025 envisaged a reformed Palestinian Authority and demanded Hamas’s disarmament and exclusion from Gaza’s future government. Those conditions show how much institutional and security work lies behind the diplomatic language of statehood. UK recognition statement
These responsibilities are different, and the balance of power is unequal. Israel has far greater control over conditions on the ground. Palestinian political reform is necessary, but it cannot by itself halt settlement expansion or deliver sovereignty.
International recognition helps, but implementation is the test
Recognition can strengthen Palestinian diplomatic standing and affirm the principle that Palestinians have a right to self-determination. Britain’s decision to recognise Palestine was therefore significant.
Its limits are equally clear. Recognition alone cannot reopen a road, rebuild a hospital or guarantee that an agreed border will be respected.
The September 2026 joint statement included commitments or consideration of restrictions on trade with settlements. Such measures suggest that some governments are becoming more willing to attach practical consequences to their objections. Whether they change Israeli policy will depend on their implementation, scale and durability. Joint foreign ministers’ statement
In my view, a credible diplomatic effort would need sustained American involvement, European economic influence and regional Arab participation. It would also need measurable commitments and consequences for breaking them.
Repeated declarations of support are insufficient if the political incentives continue to favour obstruction.
What would make two states more likely?
I would look for five developments:
- A durable end to hostilities in Gaza, with reliable humanitarian access and reconstruction.
- An effective halt to settlement expansion and measures that entrench annexation.
- An Israeli government willing to negotiate meaningful Palestinian sovereignty.
- Legitimate Palestinian government capable of administering both territories and enforcing an agreement.
- A sustained international framework linking security guarantees and economic support to verifiable progress.
These changes would not settle every dispute. They would, however, provide evidence that two states were becoming an achievable political project.
Would one state be easier?
A single democratic state with equal rights for everyone deserves serious discussion. But establishing it would require agreement over citizenship, national identity, security, property and the sharing of political power.
Those questions do not become easier simply because drawing a border has become harder. A confederation would likewise require cooperation and institutions capable of surviving profound disagreements.
The most plausible consequence of failed diplomacy, in my assessment, is continued unequal control, insecurity and recurring violence. There is no guarantee that the collapse of the two-state project would produce a fairer alternative.
Whatever constitutional arrangement ultimately emerges, equal rights and civilian protection must remain central.
So how likely is a two-state solution? Unlikely in the near term, still possible over the longer term, and increasingly difficult if current trends continue.
Supporting it requires honesty about those obstacles. It also requires refusing to treat today’s political choices as an inevitable future.
The measure of progress will be whether Israelis and Palestinians gain real security, freedom and control over their lives. Until diplomacy begins delivering those things, two states will remain a promise waiting for the means to fulfil it.
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