Peace will require more than silencing the guns. It must protect Ukraine’s sovereignty, give both populations confidence that war will not resume, and prevent military conquest from being rewarded.
Everyone wants peace in Ukraine—or at least claims to. The difficulty is that the word “peace” can describe radically different outcomes.
It might mean a temporary ceasefire that freezes the front line. It might mean a settlement imposed on Ukraine under military pressure. Or it could mean a negotiated arrangement that ends the fighting while creating credible political, economic and security foundations for a lasting peace.
These possibilities should not be confused.
This is exactly the kind of difficult question explored by the Wez G – Peace Podcast: not merely how a war can be paused, but how enemies can move towards a peace that is just, credible and capable of surviving future political shocks.
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, following its seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014. That matters because diplomacy cannot begin from a fiction that the war simply erupted between two equally situated parties. Ukraine is defending its territory; Russia is occupying part of it.
At the same time, acknowledging responsibility for the war does not remove the need for negotiation. Nearly every war eventually requires some form of political settlement. The question is how to negotiate without legitimising territorial conquest or merely preparing the ground for another invasion.
Why an immediate grand bargain is unlikely
The central positions of Russia and Ukraine remain extremely far apart.
Ukraine seeks sovereignty, territorial integrity, the return of prisoners and deported children, accountability, reconstruction and reliable protection against renewed aggression. Its official Peace Formula also addresses nuclear safety, food and energy security, environmental damage and the withdrawal of Russian forces.
Russia has demanded recognition of its claimed annexations, limits on Ukraine’s armed forces and permanent restrictions on Ukraine’s security relationships. These terms would leave Ukraine substantially less able to resist another attack. The two sides therefore disagree not only about territory, but about whether post-war Ukraine would be genuinely sovereign.
Territory is the most visible dispute, but security is the deeper one. Ukraine has already experienced agreements and ceasefires that failed to prevent renewed war. It will not readily accept another promise that lacks the means to enforce it.
This makes a single conference producing a comprehensive peace treaty improbable. A more realistic approach would be phased, conditional and closely monitored.
First, protect people before solving everything
Diplomacy does not have to settle every political question before reducing human suffering.
The first stage could consist of practical, independently verifiable measures:
- Ending attacks on civilians and critical energy infrastructure.
- Protecting nuclear facilities, particularly the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, according to the IAEA’s safety principles.
- Expanding prisoner exchanges and releasing unlawfully detained civilians.
- Returning deported and forcibly transferred children.
- Sharing information about missing people and repatriating human remains.
- Protecting commercial shipping and food exports through the Black Sea.
- Establishing local pauses in fighting for evacuations, repairs and demining.
Such agreements would not constitute peace, but they could save lives and test whether commitments are being honoured. Previous negotiations have shown that limited humanitarian cooperation remains possible even while wider political talks are stalled. The ICRC, for example, supported a large repatriation of human remains agreed during talks in 2025.
A ceasefire must be monitored and enforceable
A ceasefire could create space for diplomacy, but an unprotected ceasefire might simply give each side time to rearm.
Any credible arrangement would need:
- A precisely mapped line of contact.
- Satellite, aerial and ground-based monitoring.
- A mechanism for investigating alleged violations.
- Military communication channels to prevent accidental escalation.
- Agreed restrictions around nuclear plants and other sensitive locations.
- Predetermined consequences for serious breaches.
A neutral monitoring mission could include states acceptable to both parties, supported by technical expertise from the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or specially created international bodies.
The distinction between a military line and a recognised border would be essential. A ceasefire could halt fighting along the existing front without requiring Ukraine—or other countries—to recognise Russian sovereignty over occupied territory. Comparable disputes elsewhere have remained legally unresolved for decades while immediate hostilities were contained.
That would be an unsatisfactory compromise, but potentially preferable to indefinite large-scale war—provided it did not become a licence for renewed aggression.
Ukraine will need meaningful security guarantees
The strongest guarantee would be Ukraine’s continued ability to defend itself.
This means a capable Ukrainian military, reliable supplies, air defence, intelligence cooperation, domestic weapons production and rapid assistance if Russia attacks again. European governments have repeatedly argued that any settlement must include robust and credible security guarantees.
Those guarantees could combine:
- Long-term defence agreements with European and North American countries.
- Automatic military and economic assistance following a verified attack.
- A multinational reassurance or monitoring presence.
- Pre-positioned equipment and joint training.
- Automatic restoration of sanctions if the settlement is violated.
- Continued progress towards European Union membership.
Vague assurances will not be enough. Guarantees must specify who will act, what assistance will be provided and how quickly it will arrive.
Russia would almost certainly object to parts of this architecture. A wider European security dialogue could therefore address missile deployments, military exercises, incident-prevention measures and conventional arms control. But such talks must not give Moscow a veto over Ukraine’s sovereignty or reward the use of force.
Territory may need to be deferred
No territorial formula currently appears capable of satisfying both sides.
Ukraine cannot easily surrender its citizens or legally recognise territory seized through war. Russia, meanwhile, has shown no willingness to abandon its territorial claims voluntarily.
A possible interim arrangement would defer the final legal status of occupied territories while prohibiting attempts to change the line of control by force. Negotiations over their future could continue separately under international mediation.
This would not mean accepting annexation. International recognition should remain tied to the principle that borders cannot lawfully be changed through military conquest. The UN General Assembly has continued to affirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to call for a just peace consistent with the UN Charter.
Proposals for territorial referendums would only become credible after demilitarisation, the return of displaced residents, freedom of political activity and independent international supervision. Votes conducted under occupation cannot provide legitimate consent.
Sanctions can become part of the negotiation
Sanctions should be treated as leverage rather than lifted all at once.
A settlement could link limited, reversible sanctions relief to verified Russian actions: maintaining a ceasefire, withdrawing specified forces, returning detainees or participating in agreed monitoring. Serious violations would trigger automatic reimposition.
This step-by-step model would provide incentives for compliance without asking Ukraine’s partners to rely solely on trust.
Frozen Russian state assets and other funds will also remain central to arguments over compensation and reconstruction. The scale of destruction is immense: the latest joint assessment by the World Bank, Ukraine, the European Commission and the UN estimated recovery and reconstruction needs at approximately $588 billion over ten years.
Reconstruction should begin before a final treaty wherever conditions permit. Repairing homes, schools, hospitals and energy systems is not only humanitarian work; it strengthens the possibility of a stable post-war society.
Justice and peace are not opposites
Some argue that accountability must be abandoned to secure peace. Others insist that no negotiation is legitimate until every crime has been prosecuted. Neither extreme provides a workable path.
Evidence should continue to be collected, victims must retain their rights, and international investigations should remain independent. At the same time, negotiators may need to decide how particular accountability measures interact with ceasefires, prisoner releases and political agreements.
There should be no blanket amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international law. But justice can operate through several channels and over a long period: domestic courts, international institutions, compensation mechanisms, truth recovery and sanctions against responsible individuals.
A durable peace cannot be built by telling victims that their experiences no longer matter.
Who should be involved?
Ukraine must be present wherever Ukraine’s future is discussed. A settlement negotiated over its head would lack both legitimacy and durability.
Russia must also participate because no bilateral peace can be concluded without it. The United States and European countries will be essential because they possess much of the diplomatic, military and economic leverage required to support and enforce an agreement.
Other states—including Türkiye, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and countries from the wider Global South—could help mediate specific questions or provide monitors. The UN and specialist organisations could support humanitarian arrangements, nuclear safety, verification and reconstruction.
Different groups may be better suited to different parts of the process. Expecting one mediator to solve every issue would create unnecessary failure points.
The least unrealistic road to peace
A plausible sequence might therefore look like this:
- Humanitarian agreements and protection of critical infrastructure.
- A comprehensive, monitored ceasefire.
- Prisoner releases, return of children and expanded tracing of missing people.
- Deployment of monitoring arrangements and credible security guarantees.
- Phased sanctions relief tied to verified compliance.
- Reconstruction and compensation mechanisms.
- Long-term negotiations over occupied territories and regional security.
- Continuing accountability for serious international crimes.
None of this guarantees success. Spoilers could undermine negotiations, ceasefires could collapse and domestic politics could make compromise impossible.
Yet the alternative—treating peace as either a perfect final settlement or an imposed surrender—leaves little room for useful diplomacy.
The most realistic peace may initially be incomplete. It may postpone territorial questions and require years of verification, deterrence and negotiation. But it must satisfy three fundamental tests: Ukrainians must be able to live freely and securely; Russia must have no incentive to restart the war; and the international system must not establish that invading a neighbour is an effective way to acquire territory.
Peace is not simply the moment the shooting stops. It is the creation of conditions in which starting it again no longer appears worthwhile.
For more conversations about conflict resolution, reconciliation and the difficult work required to turn ceasefires into sustainable peace, follow the Wez G – Peace Podcast and continue the discussion at wezg.co.uk.
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